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ABSTRACT

Executive Orders on a Political Timeline: Examination of Executive Orders in the
Supreme Court and Stephen Skowronek’s Theory of Presidential Leadership

by

Alisha Urrutia, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2022

Major Professor: Dr. Robert Ross
Department: Political Science

Most existing scholarship on executive order frequency uses individual
characteristics or historical timing as primary independent variables. Here, the frequency
of executive orders and contestation in the Supreme Court was examined using Stephen
Skowronek’s theory of political time. I hypothesized disjunctive presidents would issue
the most executive orders on average and reconstructive presidents would have the most
challenged in the Supreme Court. I examined this theory after extensive data collection.
In three out of the four Skowronek time periods, I found disjunctive presidents issued the
most executive orders. The only period in which the disjunctive president did not issue
the most orders included Franklin Roosevelt, who is commonly considered the outlier in
relation to executive orders. However, I did not find a correlation between Skowronek’s
categories and contestation of executive orders in the Supreme Court.
(68 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Executive Orders on a Political Timeline: Examination of Executive Orders in the
Supreme Court and Stephen Skowronek’s Theory of Presidential Leadership
Alisha Urrutia

The research performed here applies a theoretical model of the presidency by
Stephen Skowronek that spans all of American history to the number of executive orders
issued per president and the number of these orders argued before the Supreme Court per
president. I hypothesized that presidents who have the fewest political resources available
to them (disjunctive presidents) would issue the most executive orders, and presidents
who transform the face of American government and politics (reconstructionists) would
face the most Supreme Court cases dealing with executive orders. I created two datasets
for this research and used descriptive statistics to evaluate these hypotheses. In three out
of the four time periods examined, disjunctive presidents issued more orders than all
other presidents. However, I did not find a correlation between presidential type and how
many Supreme Court cases they faced. This research produced accurate data that can be
used to study executive orders for years to come and contributed to our understanding of
why presidents choose to exercise unilateral actions to accomplish their policy goals
rather than negotiate with Congress. As this was written as a partial requirement for a
master’s degree and did not require any grants, the public cost of this research was
minimal.
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Introduction

Skowronek’s Theory
The Politics Presidents Make by Stephen Skowronek has brought to light a new
way in which we view the presidency. In this book, Skowronek encourages scholars to
consider presidents in a cyclical pattern rather than in the traditional chronological order.
He combines two theories of political timing to invent an original classification of
presidencies. Skowronek distinguishes between what he refers to as political time and
secular time, dividing presidents into distinct categories. He claims presidents have more
similar leadership styles to other presidents placed in similar political situations than
those who simply serve in the same time period. To Skowronek, Ronald Reagan’s
administrative style is much more similar to Andrew Jackson’s than Bill Clinton’s. He
argues that comparing executives through this lens offers more information about
presidential administrations than comparing presidents in sequential order.
Skowronek categorizes the presidency as an office that habitually asserts control
over other offices, regularly disrupts power arrangements and institutional hierarchies,
routinely open new avenues for political activity, and whose normal operations push the
boundaries of typical political life. He argues that since all presidents have similar
constitutional constraints on formal and informal powers, although presidents serving in a
similar time period share comparable organizational and institutional resources,
differences within coalition and political regime positions are the main factors in the
variety of presidential leadership styles (14). He appeals to a presidential paradox
between the executive’s desire to control their place in history and eagerness to establish
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their administrations upon their own terms, making the very institution they wish to
control hostile to the steady government structures they aim for (20). He notes presidents
act out of concern for their reputation and are constrained by the nationwide events that
take place when they are in office.
This approach recontextualizes presidential history in terms of power and
authority. Skowronek recognizes that the executive has easier access to power than
authority (17). He defines power as resources presidents have at their disposal at any
given time to effect change. Authority for Skowronek is a broad concept that extends
from expectations of a president to exercise power in specific situations to judgment
about appropriate and inappropriate actions the president may take. Presidents often have
to justify their actions and their ability to do so greatly depends on what reactions
particular moments warrant. Presidents are constantly faced with impossible situations
and must decide between responding to a demand for political action and respecting
existing political commitments and established government structures (24). Skowronek
claims that authority always takes priority over power in these decisions. Before
presidents act, they consider their place in history and must rationalize any move they
may make. It is these decisions and questionable uses of presidential authority that often
get challenged in the federal court system. As a final note on authority, Skowronek
defends presidential actions that preempt the authority of other government structures as
attempts by executives to sustain their narratives and act within the bounds they were
placed. He argues that successful political leaders are not necessarily successful because
they accomplish more than others, rather they are able to control the political
ramifications of their actions (17).
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Skowronek further designs a new way to examine American presidencies. He
encourages scholars to direct their attention to the cyclical recurrent and emergent
patterns found throughout the presidency. To do this, he establishes four political
categories to situate presidents within: politics of reconstruction, articulation, disjunction,
and preemption. He carefully places presidents within each category by their affiliation
with what he refers to as the regime. A regime refers to recent governing coalitions, party
systems, the central state, and lasting ideological and interest groups1. Skowronek defines
a partisan regime as “the commitments of ideology and interest embodied in preexisting
institutional arrangements” (34). After a brief summary of each category and its relation
to the regime, Table 1 below illustrates the dynamic relationships of Skowronek’s
typologies.
For Skowronek, reconstructive presidents like Thomas Jefferson, Abraham
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan oppose the previous regime that is
vulnerable and losing support. These presidents generally come after disjunctive
presidents and before articulators. They generally have access to the most power and
authority possible.
Presidents under the articulation category, such as James Monroe, Theodore
Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson associate with resilient regimes and follow the paths
paved by the reconstructionists. However, they also strive to modify the regime and put
their own mark on history. Articulators have a lot of power to make changes being
affiliated with the regime, yet they also have little authority to repudiate against the
regime.
1

See The Politics of Politics: Skowronek and Presidential Research.
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Disjunctive presidents like John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, Herbert Hoover,
and Jimmy Carter affiliate with vulnerable regimes and are charged with keeping the
regime together. These presidents take office when their regime is losing support and
generally only last one term. They are given a lot of authority, as they are expected to
keep the regime together, however, they are not given the power necessary to carry out
their responsibilities.
Finally, preemptive presidents are those who oppose resilient regimes and still
manage to get elected. This category is colloquially known as the accidental presidency
type, as these presidents serve as anomalies to the political institutions. These presidents
also typically only serve one term and Skowronek offers Richard Nixon, John Tyler,
Woodrow Wilson, and Andrew Johnson as examples. These presidents lack both
authority and power as there are few expectations for how a preemptive president is
supposed to act yet they have fewer resources available to them than articulators and
reconstructionists.

Table 12 Presidential Categories
President's Political Identity

Previously Vulnerable
Established
Regime
Resilient

2

Opposed

Affiliated

Reconstruction

Disjunction

Preemption

Articulation

This is an adaptation of the table found on page 36 of The Politics Presidents Make.
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Skowronek promotes the use of his theory to study what conditions of leadership
presidents share (8). These conditions of leadership include a multitude of different
variables such as wartime, natural disaster, fiscal crisis, foreign relations, economic
wellbeing, decay or strengthening of parties, public opinion of the presidency, existing
executive agencies, civil unrest, congressional partisanship, Supreme Court relations, etc.
While it may be beneficial to use this lens to examine many aspects of presidential
administrations, here I use these theories to research the issuance of executive orders and
investigate if there is a relationship between Skowronek’s presidential categories and
contestation of executive orders in the Supreme Court3.

Executive Orders
Executive orders (EOs) are federal directives presidents use to communicate with
executive agencies. They fall under the class of executive unilateral actions4. Presidents
use these orders to reorganize executive agencies, modify administrative processes,
3

Contestation in the Supreme Court refers to any Supreme Court case that deals with a question
of the validity or constitutionality of an executive order.
4
The term ‘executive orders’ is often colloquially used to refer to executive orders, presidential
memoranda, and presidential proclamations. For the purpose of this study, ‘executive orders’
refers solely to unilateral actions categorized as executive orders by the White House.
Examining only executive orders creates limitations on the cases reviewed in this
project. One may notice some landmark cases on unilateral action such as U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. and Rasul v. Bush missing from this review. This is because U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. challenges a presidential proclamation rather than an executive order and Rasul v.
Bush represents a case where the Supreme Court determines the extent of the Court’s authority,
not the presidents. There will be more on this later. While analysis of all unilateral actions would
add depth to this investigation and provide a more inclusive and cohesive understanding of
executive power, that is outside the scope of this research.
According to the Federal Register, presidents communicate information about holidays,
commemorations, special observances, trade, and policy through proclamations. Since the
majority of these deal with ceremonial issues, and most executive orders deal with the operations
of the executive branch, I decided to examine executive orders rather than proclamations for this
project. Executive orders better represent the separation of powers principle and executive
legislation.
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respond to crises, and create or alter policy. Most importantly, presidents use executive
orders to flex their legislative muscles. Executives often use these orders to alter how
agencies interpret and implement legislation from Congress or solve policy goals while
waiting on decisions from the Supreme Court or Congress. EOs are typically considered
law and remain in effect until they expire, are revoked, are canceled, or are ruled
unlawful by a federal court. Once in court, justices typically uphold orders or at least treat
them as legally binding as long as they do not violate the Constitution or other legislative
statutes.
The Constitution is technically silent on the issue of executive orders. Presidents
generally stake authority to issue executive orders in the Take Care Clause 5 of Article II
of the Constitution. This clause grants the president with the responsibility to ensure the
laws are faithfully executed. When further justification of executive orders is necessary,
presidents use statutes where Congress has delegated explicit authority to the executive to
issue Eos in particular circumstances. Executive orders illustrate the American system of
checks and balances and the executive’s relationships with the legislative and judicial
branches. Both the federal courts and Congress have the ability to nullify an order. The
president uses orders to alter the way executive departments heed legislation and court
opinions.
As Skowronek discusses, society today enjoys focusing on the political
ineffectiveness of our nation’s leaders. As a result, positive changes from the oval office
are often overlooked (3). Executive orders are an excellent indication of the presidency’s

5

U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. 1.
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political and legal impact, as they are a direct measurement of some of the executive’s
contributions to policy.

Purpose
This project examines Stephen Skowronek’s theories in terms of executive order
issuance and contestation in the Supreme Court. The goal is to discover if his theories of
political and secular time can account for fluctuations in executive order issuance and
challenges in the Supreme Court6. It evaluates if Skowronek’s theory can explain why
some presidents issue more executive orders and are challenged more often in the
Supreme Court than others7. It is theorized here that executive order issuance and
contestation can be displayed as a function of Skowronek’s presidential categorizations
and secular time theories. The heart of this investigation is to examine if Skowronek’s
theory reveals the certain political arrangements that lead to more executive orders being
issued or challenged in court.
This contribution to executive order literature is twofold. First, an original dataset
was created for this investigation. This data collection effort became necessary as, before
this project, no source with an accurate count of executive orders issued by each
6

It would also be beneficial to continue this research on other federal courts. Given the scope of
this research, I decided to examine EO challenges on the Supreme Court level because cases
granted certiorari to the Supreme Court have gone through the maximum number of appeals
processes and have allowed Congress the opportunity to revoke the order. This selection of cases
guarantees the most salient and controversial executive orders challenged in the federal courts
are examined for this project. Further research could assess all federal courts or perhaps even
State Supreme Courts and gubernatorial executive orders.
7
When first contemplating this investigation, I questioned if EO issuance was a reason for
categorization rather than a product of it. However, after thorough consideration of Skowronek’s
book, I concluded that unilateral action was not used as a factor when designating certain
presidents to specific categories.
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president was readily available. Second, this dataset is used to assess whether or not
Skowronek’s theory identifies the political arrangements that necessitate the issuance of
executive orders and encourage contestation of executive orders in the Supreme Court.

Why Skowronek
Through extensive research performed on executive orders, it has become clear
that EO issuance has varied over time. Yet, as Figure 18 illustrates, this variance has not
been exponential but has spiked at various times throughout our history. These sudden
changes indicate that certain political arrangements lead to more executive orders being
issued than others. Skowronek provides an explanation for which political arrangements
these may be by examining the presidency out of sequential order. Skowronek argues that
patterns within the presidency are difficult to see when spread out over time, and
periodization structures that depend on outside events severely limit presidential research
(4-7).
Linear history does provide some explanation for the change in frequency of EOs.
For example, not only do we see a sudden rise during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency,
but we witness a lasting impact on the president’s ability and willingness to issue
executive orders since. However, as Figure 2 shows, linear history does not provide an
explanation for the frequency in which executive orders are contested in the Supreme
Court. There is no visible pattern when examining EO contestation in the court on a

8

Figure 1 shows the average number of executive orders issued by each president per year. The
average was calculated by dividing the number of EOs a president issued by the amount of time
the president was in office.
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timeline or when compared to the average number of EOs issued per presidency. Here
again, Skowronek’s theory may offer more insight into why some presidents’ orders are
challenged more in the Court than others by considering presidents out of chronological
order.

Figure 1
Average EO issued per Year per President
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Figure 2
Total Cases Contesting Executive Orders in Supreme Court per Presidency
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Other authors9 offer categorization of the presidency outside of historical
orderings, however, Skowronek presents a unique view fit for this investigation.
Skowronek categorizes presidents based on political resources available and
commitments presidents make when they first get into office that simultaneously
empower and constrain them. Many other authors separate modern and premodern
presidents, however, a nuance of Skowronek’s theory is that it applies across the entirety
of American history. While Skowronek does not pay any particular attention to the
importance of the presidential-judiciary relationship, he does introduce a theory that
applies to the entire presidency that is worth investigating.
Keith Whittington renews the relevance of Skowronek’s theory in his book,
Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy. Here, Whittington presents a qualitative
analysis of the relationship presidents of reconstruction have with the Supreme Court.
This examination contributes to Skowronek’s theory while illustrating the difference
between recognition of judicial review and judicial supremacy. Whittington reinvigorates
the applicability of Skowronek’s theory to the study of the presidency and judiciary
today.

9

Such as Walter Russell Mead in Special Providence and Richard Neustadt in Presidential
Power.
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Background

There is a respectable amount of existing literature on executive order issuance.
Much of this scholarship addresses particular policy-changing orders (Cooper and West
1988; Morgan 1970) or constitutional issues created in the wake of executive orders
(Cooper 1986; Sunstein 1981; Fisher 1991). Although some literature accurately portrays
executive orders as substantial instruments of presidential power (Shane and Bruff 1996,
Fisher 1993), other scholarship characterizes executive orders as tools for routine and
trivial administrative business (Schramm 1981; Light 1991; Peterson 1990). As Lyn
Ragsdale points out, much of this downplaying may be attributed to the tendency among
white house scholars to focus on individual presidents, their personalities, and their
leadership skills (1996). Skowronek also finds this to be a frustration, which sparks his
journey on categorizing presidents in this cyclical pattern (Milkis 1995; Silbey 1994). He
expands the possibilities of scholarship on the presidency by creating a system for
comparing and contrasting presidencies other than by examining each president on their
own merits and personal characteristics.
Other EO literature focuses on public opinion of executive orders and executive
unilateral action in general. Researchers found EO usage negatively impacts the public’s
view of a president (Cooper 2002; Reeves and Rogowski 2016; 2018; Warber 2006).
They associate this effect with the concept of “political capital” noting there is a political
cost to every order a president issues (Beckmann 2010). These negative impacts are
largest amongst those who share the issuing president’s political values (Reeves and
Rogowski 2016). Kenneth Mayer finds that modern presidents react more to sustained
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variation in public standings and virtually ignore short-term changes in popularity (1999).
Reeves and Rogowski find the public views executive orders as less legitimate than other
types of legislation (2016).
Not only do executive orders affect public opinion, but they also affect the
opinion executive agencies and Congress have of the president. For example, Mayer
references Clinton’s campaign promise to issue an order and effectively end the ban on
gay and lesbian military service members (1999, 461) which turned into the Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell10 compromise after he faced military resistance and risked congressional
cementation of the ban (Towell 1993). Executive orders can further strain relations
between the white house and the other branches of government, thus giving presidents
more reason to ensure an executive order is absolutely necessary before issuance.
Investigations into EO revocation have discovered that executive orders founded
solely on Constitutional authority are more likely to be revoked if the current president
belongs to a different party than the issuing president (Thrower 2017). In contrast,
Kenneth Mayer did not observe a stark difference in the issuance of executive orders with
a party shift in the white house (1999, 457). Executive orders are less likely to be revoked
when created within a divided government. Researchers credit this to presidential
attempts at appeasing both sides of the party line in Congress and inherently creating
more bipartisan orders that stick around longer than the partisan orders created under
unified government (Thrower 2017). Conversely, it was found that modern presidents
like Eisenhower and Clinton issue more orders when their party has a majority in
congress (Mayer 1999). While this finding is contrary to conventional wisdom, Mayer
10

10. U.S.C. § 654.
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attributes this to the complicated dynamic between Congress and the presidency (1999,
461).
As mentioned previously, executive orders are related to political capital and cost
(Reeves and Rogowski 2018). The more political capital a president has, the more likely
they are to revoke previously established executive orders (Thrower 2017). In contrast,
scientists also found “as presidents become less popular, they tend to issue more orders, a
result consistent with the hypothesis that executive orders provide a way for presidents to
act on their own without relying on other institutions or actors” (Mayer 1999).
Whittington posits a contradiction to this hypothesis by theorizing that the Supreme Court
helps presidents of disjunction and articulation11 the most (158).
Issuance of executive orders also varies depending on the stage of the issuing
president’s career. While the timing of a president’s tenure appears to have no significant
effect on the frequency of orders, incumbents are more likely to issue EOs if they are
campaigning or anticipating a party shift in their final year (Mayer 1999). This supports
the hypothesis that executive orders are used to achieve political goals, as there are few
nonpolitical reasons presidents would deem it necessary to issue or revoke more orders
than usual before a party shift in the oval office.
Studies have also found the timing of executive orders often correlates to other
large events that preoccupy the media. Researchers discovered that executive orders were
more likely to be issued during times the white house was aware the media would be

Whittington refers to these two types as “affiliated presidents,” as they are affiliated with the
previously established regime. Affiliated presidents are able to rely on the Court more so than
unaffiliated presidents.
11
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focused on other affairs (Djourelova and Durante 2019). It is important to note there may
be some endogeneity with this investigation, as presidents are likely to issue more
executive orders in times of crisis when a swift reaction is necessary and there is no time
to wait for Congress to respond. While usually necessitate a higher frequency of
executive orders, they are also the events that cause busy media episodes.
It is consistently recognized that modern executives have increasingly turned
away from congressional negotiations and towards unilateral actions to address their
policy goals (Beckmann 2010; Brockway and Hollibaugh 2020; Cooper 1986, 2002;
Ragsdale 1996; Reeves and Rogowski 2016). Today, presidents campaign on their ability
to issue executive orders to accomplish personal and party goals. Pre-modern presidents
scarcely used executive orders. EOs were so insignificant they were never officially
recorded until Abraham Lincoln12. It wasn’t until Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency that all
executive orders were required to be numbered and documented in the Federal Register13.
Skowronek accounts for this increase in executive orders over time with his secular time
theory. He claims that over time presidents have slowly lost access to tools used to
mediate with other branches of the federal government. They have been limited in their
abilities to negotiate with Congress and no longer command the same amount of respect
with their names and title as those in the past.
Skowronek divides American history into four periods defined by the most
relevant resource of presidential power14. In the age of patrician politics (1789–1832),

12

See Historical Records Survey or dataset below.
See Federal Register.
14
Skowronek provides an easily understood table of these periods on page 53 of The Politics
Presidents Make.
13
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presidents were elected because of their personal reputation with dignitaries. They were
able to easily negotiate with other institutions, as many of them helped found those same
institutions. In the period of partisan politics (1832-1900), the title of president, or
executive patronage was a formidable resource of power for presidents such as Jackson
and Lincoln. During the pluralist period (1900 – 1972), FDR and his contemporaries used
nationalized interests and rise of America on the global scale as reason to expand the
executive. Lastly, in the period of plebiscitary politics (1972-present), while mass
communication technology has become readily available, the president’s toolbox is
waning, and the executive has lost a substantial amount of negotiating leverage.
The scholarship surrounding executive orders is broad. It is commonly understood
in this literature that presidents prefer their policy goals to be solidified through
legislation over the temporary solution unilateral action offers. However, it is also
recognized that Congress is a slow-moving machine that cannot accomplish all the goals
an executive establishes in one presidential term. Because of this, presidents are forced to
issue executive orders in order to achieve all of their policy objectives. Some scholarship
concentrates on individual presidencies and what characteristics cause an influx of EOs.
Other scholarship examines the content of specific orders and the Constitutional enigmas
they impose. However, little scholarship applies theoretical models to executive order
issuance across all presidencies and even less applies these models to executive orders
challenged in the Supreme Court. There is variation in the frequency of EOs and this
variation should correspond to specific political conditions of presidential leadership.

16
Relationship between the Presidency and the Supreme Court
Some political analysts challenge the constitutionality of executive orders.
Whether in an online article or a federal court case, the president’s authority to issue EOs
is constantly called into question. While the most generic explanation provides that EOs
relate to an executive’s prerogative power and duty to ensure the laws are faithfully
executed15, many examiners of presidential authority require a more in-depth
rationalization of why EOs are issued. Many of those opposed to EO usage cite the
nondelegation doctrine16, which denies the president the ability to have legislative power
over issues Congress cannot legally delegate authority to, as why executive orders should
be rejected or revoked. In Dalton v. Spencer, the Court cites Panama Refining Co. v Ryan
and Youngstown as:
“example[s] of when we have reviewed the constitutionality of the
President's actions, [which] did not involve a claim that the President
acted in excess of his statutory authority…We struck down an Executive
Order promulgated under that Act not because the President had acted
beyond his statutory authority, but rather because the Act
unconstitutionally delegated Congress' authority to the President…
Youngstown thus
involved
the
conceded absence of any statutory
authority, not a claim that the President acted in excess of such
authority”17.

In these cases, the Court explicitly does not reject a president’s authority to issue
executive orders but rather places the unconstitutionality of this action on Congress.
One way in which a sector of the public can display dissatisfaction with an
executive order is by challenging the order in the federal court system. The Supreme
15
16

U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. 1.
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

17

Footnotes from Dalton v. Specter.
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Court was established to be a group of Americans well-versed in the law, separated from
the rest of the government that interpreted the Constitution. Because the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to cases that contest the use of executive orders, and because they often
opine EOs to be in accordance with constitutional principles, we can conclude the top
legal minds in the U.S. consider executive orders to be Constitutional at least under some
circumstances. Even when the Supreme Court strikes down an executive order, they will
continue to recognize the president’s authority to issue them. In Boumediene v. Bush the
Court noted:
“Our opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as Commander
in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not
eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch. Within the Constitution's
separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as
legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the
authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”18
If one gives the utmost legitimacy to the Constitution, which is the document from which
the Court originates, one must also understand the legitimacy of the Court itself and the
decisions it promulgates. By accepting EO cases to be considered under judicial review,
the Supreme Court acknowledges the legitimacy and constitutionality of executive
orders.
The relationship between the Supreme Court and the presidency when it comes to
executive orders is complicated but always centers around statutes and the Constitution.
As illustrated in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan the Court is unconcerned with
considerations beyond the scope of their purview:
“The question whether such a delegation of legislative power is permitted
by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be
18

See Boumediene v. Bush.
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assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for what he believes to
be the public good. The point is not one of motives, but of constitutional
authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute.”19
The Court continually recognizes the separate functions and responsibilities of both
branches and attempts to convey this in their opinions on the constitutionality of
executive actions. The Court will recognize limitations within the nature of their
department, such as a lack of knowledge about the current state of affairs, and remark on
their contributions to the checks and balances principle in the same case. Take for
example these notes from Boumediene v. Bush:
“Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither
the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with
briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its
people” (2276-77).
“Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after
being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most
pressing” (2269).
If the court can find support for the president within the Constitution or legal
statute, they will uphold the executive order. In their justification for favoring the
executive, the court will point to the exact delegation of authority. For example, in
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the court cites “The Act explicitly authorizes Executive Orders
‘necessary to effectuate [its] provisions.’ § 486(a)” as reason to uphold the order.20 In
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, the Court not only cites statute but
also lists the Constitutional authority a president has to issue the specific EO in question.
“The President's action was taken under the Constitution, as President of
the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and by
virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the War Labor Disputes Act,
19

See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 306, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1720, 60 L. Ed. 2d 208
(1979).
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57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C.App. ss 1501—1511, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, ss
1501—1511. Section 3 of the Act authorizes the seizure of facilities
necessary for the war effort if and when the President finds and proclaims
that strikes or other labor disturbances are interrupting the operation of
such facilities”21.
There has been considerable growth in both the size and power of the Supreme
Court and the administrative state. The Court’s caseload has changed dramatically since
its founding, as has the president’s use of unilateral actions. The Supreme Court’s
authority has expanded over a whole host of contemporary issues since its establishment.
Marbury v. Madison gave the court judicial review, Roe v. Wade extended the Court’s
influence over social issues, and Baker v. Carr gave the court influence over state
legislature structures. In this same time period, presidents went from using executive
orders for administrative business and making appointments, to creating new agencies
and national parks, to sending citizens of Japanese descent to internment camps across
the country22. Because both branches have continued to grow and expand their influence
on policy issues, we can recognize the ability of either branch to counteract the
ambition23 of the other throughout American history.
It is important to bring attention to another limitation when examining Supreme
Court EO cases. While the president has the ability to issue an executive order over any
topic at any time he sees fit, the Court has to wait for a case to present itself to it. The
Court cannot challenge any EO without a citizen or institution disputing the order first.
Because of this obstacle, there is often a lag between EO issuance and dispute in the
Supreme Court.
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See Executive Order 9066.
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Theory

Executive Order Issuance
Here, it is necessary to define an assumption about the nature of executive orders.
For this analysis, we assume presidents prefer to have their policies codified in legislative
statute rather than pursue their agendas through unilateral action (Reeves and Rogowski
2016). Since presidents would rather their policies endure, and because EOs are easily
revoked, presidents push for their policy preferences to be cemented in federal law.
Through cooperation with Congress, presidents get policies codified which means they
are less frequently amended or canceled.
It is undeniable there has been a change in EO issuance over time. However, this
growth has not been exponential. It is apparent other factors influence the frequency of
executive orders. The first inquiry made here compares Skowronek’s categorizations to
executive order issuance. I expect to find disjunctive presidents issue more EOs than any
other Skowronek presidential category. I do not propose that because a president is
disjunctive, they will inherently issue more executive orders, but rather the political
conditions Skowronek identifies and uses to categorize presidents may also account for
variation in EO issuance.
Since scholars have established that the frequency of executive orders varies with
changes to a president’s political environment, and Skowronek categorizes presidents
based on their political environments, one of the purposes of this research is to determine
if Skowronek’s categorization aligns with a meaningful change in the frequency of
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executive orders. If there is a correlation between executive order issuance and
Skowronek’s political timeline, this will not only mean Skowronek’s theory may apply to
a microlevel of observations about the presidency, but may also contribute to our
understanding of the modern presidency and help contemporary political scientists
determine what stage of Skowronek’s political cycle current presidents reside in.
According to Skowronek, presidents elected in the outright rejection of their
predecessors have the most expansive warrant for disruption.
“The exercise of presidential power will be relatively unencumbered in
these circumstances because the incumbent is implicitly authorized by his
election to constitute an alternative to the discredited past. In all other
circumstances, however, presidents will find themselves at cross purposed,
in one way or another disrupting a regime they do not have any clear
authority to repudiate” (23).
.
Due to this expansive warrant, I speculate presidents elected out of the rejection of their
predecessors (reconstructionists and preemptive presidents) have a lesser need to issue
executive orders than affiliated presidents. Presidents opposed to the previous regime
have other, more effective tools that cost less political capital available to them because
they are unconstrained by previous political arrangements and institutions.
It is expected that if Skowronek’s categorizations align with the frequency of
executive orders, disjunctive presidents will issue the most EOs on average.
Reconstructionists are president during the times of peak expansiveness of executive
power. The public supports reconstructionists the most, and since it has been discovered
that unpopular presidents issue more EOs than popular presidents24, I expect to find they

24

See Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion and the Presidency as well as Executive Orders and
Presidential Power.

22
issue fewer executive orders than disjunctive presidents. Because of this high political
capital and public trust, reconstructionists are less like likely to be reprimanded for using
other tools and are given the most prerogative to carry out the functions of the executive
branch. Presidents of reconstruction are expected and encouraged to make the most
changes in American government, are tasked with fixing nationwide problems, and set
the agenda that articulators and disjunctive presidents follow. This inherently gives them
access to a multitude of resources that are unavailable to all other president types. The
people, executive agencies, and Congress are enthusiastic about a new kind of
administration, especially after enduring the ‘incompetent’ leadership of disjunctive
presidents and are therefore going to allow reconstructionists more ways to implement
policy than solely unilateral action. Because of this, it is not likely that presidents of
reconstruction will issue the most executive orders on average.
Skowronek refers to a number of ‘challenging cases’ that he says are unique in
that they are the exemptions to his theory. Skowronek does not consider these presidents
to belong to their own category as they do not align with any particular stage in the
political timeline. He lists presidents Eisenhower, Coolidge, and Cleveland as being these
exemptions because of their inaction in political climates that would have normally
resulted in definitive action and categorization. Because of this inaction principle, it is
expected that these presidents write the fewest executive orders. However, because
Skowronek does not regard these presidents as belonging to their own division, they are
not considered here in this analysis of Skowronek’s typologies.
Out of Skowronek’s four main classifications, it is expected that presidents of
disjunction will issue the most executive orders. Articulators and disjunctive presidents
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are constricted by the plan set in place and promises made by the reconstructionists.
Preemptive presidents are restricted by a previous regime that the people and Congress
still support. All of these restrictions lead one to believe that since these presidents have
fewer options, they are more likely to issue executive orders than reconstructionists.
Articulators are put into office to continue the regime set in place by a
reconstructionist and the public expects articulators to follow as closely as possible to the
agenda set by the their predecessor. The people aren’t likely to support original ideas
from articulators or disjunctive presidents. Presidents of reconstruction may not always
provide the most effective or efficient solutions to the nationwide problems they are
tasked with, and articulators and disjunctive presidents are left to make sense of the
disorder. Since we assume presidents aim for their policy goals to be codified, and
cementation of policy is more likely to happen during the tenure of articulators and
reconstructionists when Congress is more supportive of the contemporary regime, we can
conclude that during presidential eras in which presidents are unaffiliated with the regime
(disjunctive and preemptive eras), more executive orders will be issued than in eras in
which the president is affiliated with the regime.
Disjunctive presidents have the fewest political resources available to them. They
aren’t allowed the same creative freedom to shape a regime as reconstructionists, are
constricted by an affiliation to an existing regime unlike preemptive presidents and are
charged with keeping the regime together rather than simply remodeling some aspects of
it like articulators. They are given a lot of authority according to Skowronek’s definition,
as they are expected to exercise the executive powers they are not given. With the
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constant expectation to act and the inability to do so through normal channels, disjunctive
presidents turn towards executive orders to achieve their goals.
Disjunctive presidents commonly have the worst public standing of all
presidential types. Because of this low political capital, disjunctive presidents are less
concerned with the political costs of issuing orders. No other presidency type has this
luxury. While disjunctive presidents are often viewed in the public’s eye as incompetent,
Skowronek attributes these attitudes to what he refers to as the impossible leadership
situation, wherein these presidents are given a significant amount of responsibility and
none of the tools necessary to complete the task (39).
In disjunctive presidencies, the nationwide problems that lead to the election of a
reconstructionist begin to emerge. The public’s opinion of the current regime is waning,
and Congress is no longer on the side of the president. Disjunctive presidents lead in a
time when the people and Congress are ready for new constitutional understandings,
partisan regimes, and leadership styles. The only institution that is supportive of these
disjunctive presidents is the Supreme Court due to the regime transition delay which
provides for justices that are product of the same regime as the president.
Presidents of disjunction are affiliated with vulnerable regimes, don’t have a good
relationship with Congress, and require more quick fixes than other president types
because they are tasked with putting a crumbling regime back together. They are
typically presidents that only last one term and have low popularity among citizens.
Nationwide dilemmas present themselves during politics of disjunction and these
presidents are unable to properly address them. For these reasons, I hypothesize that
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presidents of disjunction will issue more executive orders than any other presidential
type, and reconstructionists will issue the least EOs out of all of Skowronek’s categories.
Executive Orders in the Supreme Court
The second question here investigates Skowronek’s categorizations and EOs
contested in the Supreme Court. I expect to find that presidents of reconstruction will
face the most opposition to their executive orders in the Supreme Court because they are
elected out of rejection for the regime at least the majority of the justices were appointed
by. I anticipate that executive orders issued by reconstructionists will be challenged and
revoked by the court more than any other type of president. This pattern should continue
in a downwards trend, as I expect articulators to have fewer confrontations with the court
than reconstructionists, preemptive presidents to have fewer than articulators, and
disjunctive presidents to have the fewest orders put on trial or revoked.
Executive orders deliberated in the Supreme Court are necessarily considered by
some to be outside the scope of presidential power, have a negative impact on a federal
institution or interest group, deal with substantive policy, and have the tacit consent of
Congress. The Court cannot challenge executive authority unless a case is brought before
them. This necessitates that all cases considered in the Supreme Court begin with the
complaint of an individual against government actors. In order for the Court to deem an
EO worthy of argument, there must be some factor of the EO that relates to policy, and
there must be a cluster of citizens that consider the EO to be unconstitutional. Lastly, the
Supreme Court only tries orders that Congress at least tacitly if not explicitly authorizes.
Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate appeals court, the cases granted certiorari have
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already gone through the federal justice system at least once. While the Supreme Court
has to wait for the chance to challenge an executive order, Congress doesn’t. While in
session, Congress has the ability to address these executive orders, and while they are
contested in the federal court system, Congress has many opportunities to confront the
EO and at least the majority chose not to.
Executive orders tried in the Supreme Court call for further examination. These
cases and orders represent situations in which presidents straddle the division between
Constitutional and congressionally delegated authority and an abuse of power. Since we
can assume the majority of Congress is unconcerned with the extent of executive power
in these disputes, these cases represent a juxtaposition between judicial and presidential
power. These cases serve as examples of when the judiciary is placing checks on the
executive without congressional interference.
Due to the nature of the reconstructive presidencies, I predict that out of all of
Skowronek’s presidential categories, reconstructive presidents will face the most conflict
with the Supreme Court. This is mostly due to a regime transition delay found in the
Court. Because justices retain office during good behavior 25, regime changes happen
more slowly than in the presidency and Congress. Reconstructive presidents begin their
tenure facing a court appointed by the previous regime. By the time articulators are
elected, the Supreme Court is typically a product of the previous and current regimes
blended together. At least some of this court will have been appointed by the
reconstructionist and will be more supportive of an executive from the new regime. By
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the time disjunctive presidents get into office, the Supreme Court is entirely composed of
justices appointed by the same regime, or justices from preemptive presidents that still
had to be confirmed by a Congress from the same regime.
Contention between the Court and the presidency is highest during reconstructive
eras. All presidents Skowronek categorizes as reconstructionists are notorious for having
strained relations with the Supreme Court. Lincoln had a standoff with Chief Justice
Taney over Habeus Corpus, FDR campaigned to ‘pack-the-court’ while he was in office,
and Chief Justice Marshall caused both Jefferson and Jackson to face hardships. Ronald
Reagan’s entire dynamic with the Court was strained, especially considering he even had
trouble with judicial nominations26.
Since preemptive presidents are elected out of rejection of the contemporary
dominating regime, we can assume the relations between these presidents and the court
will be sporadic. These presidents may better align with past regimes or have a unique
outlook on the presidency. They are elected at random times throughout different
regimes. Because of this, these presidents may have hostile, peaceful, or ambivalent
relations with the Court. The frequency of preemptive EOs being tried in the Supreme
Court will fluctuate, as government actors and the public have mixed feelings about all
preemptive presidents.
Alternatively, all reconstructive presidents face hostile courts. These leaders are
placed in a political situation conducive to strained relations between the presidency and
the court. Whittington recognizes that only presidents of reconstruction have the ability to
26
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Supreme Court.
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disregard court rulings and not let Supreme Court decisions derail their entire agenda. He
argues that since reconstructionists have the support of Congress and the public, they
have the political capital to defy the court more so than other presidential type. He claims
that reconstructionists are able to reject the concept of judicial supremacy and move
forward with policy goals despite the Court’s opposition. He uses Youngstown27 to
demonstrate how the relationship between the Court and articulators differentiates from
the relationship between the Court and reconstructionists. Here he notes that Truman, an
articulator, strictly adheres to the decisions of the Court, while his predecessor, FDR,
refused to accept the supremacy of the Court and attempted to appoint additional justices
to the Supreme Court (Whittington 2007). Because Truman did not possess the same
political influence FDR did, he was unable to stand up to the Court28. Lincoln did not
face consequences from Taney when he suspended Habeus Corpus. Whittington points
out there are few presidents who would have been able to get away with such an action,
and they are all reconstructionists.
If Skowronek’s categorizations can be applied to executive orders tried in the
Supreme Court, disjunctive presidents will have the fewest orders contested or
overturned. Because of the appointment and tenure delay of the Court, the justices
disjunctive presidents face are a product of the same regime disjunctive presidents belong
to.
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See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
While this example provides useful insight into Whittington’s theory, it should be noted that
he fails to consider the possibility that Truman had less political influence because he was an
unelected president during his first term which may detract from his legitimacy in the Court’s
eyes.
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The Court is also likely to contradict articulators, however not to the extent that
they conflict with reconstructionists. Because articulators experience a court comprised
of justices appointed by current and previous regimes, it is likely the court will still
challenge presidential authority but will harmonize with articulators more. Because of
this stabilization of presidential-judiciary relations, issues that arise between the court and
the president are due to legal discrepancies rather than the political conflict we see in the
reconstructive eras. Articulators attempt to reframe a regime, which inevitably causes
disturbances and leads to questioning of presidential authority. However, this questioning
will not be as evident in the Supreme Court as it is in reconstructive eras.
Table 2 records all justices each president faced during what Skowronek defines
as the Liberal Leadership Era (Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter) with another example
of a reconstructionist (Ronald Reagan) at the end. This sample is given as a visualization
of which presidents encounter justices appointed by presidents of a different regime. As
displayed, presidents Roosevelt, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan all faced justices
appointed by presidents from a different regime than theirs. Of these presidents,
Roosevelt and Reagan are the only ones infamous for battling the Supreme Court. Out of
all these presidents, Nixon only had one EO contested in the Supreme Court, and Ford
had zero. This small sample represents the bigger idea behind why reconstructionists may
face the most contestation in the Supreme Court.
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The Datasets

Executive Order Issuance (Data)
To begin this project, it was necessary to gather data on executive order issuance.
Presidents have only been required to report executive orders to the Federal Register
since the Franklin Roosevelt presidency. This quest for data on all issued executive
orders began at UC Santa Barbara, the host of The American Presidency Project
(APP).The APP claims to be “the source of presidential documents on the internet”
(emphasis in original)29. While this was an adequate source to start with, this data only
displays the number of EOs each president issued during their presidency. This project
requires further specification of when executive orders were issued, as we began by
examining how many orders were issued and contested in the Supreme Court each year.
The APP lists Lyn Ragsdale’s Vital Statistics on the Presidency as their source for
data on executive order issuance. While examining this text, it became clear that some of
the data was inaccurate. This source credited some presidents with EOs that were issued
by preceding or succeeding presidents. Until the FDR presidency, newly elected
presidents replaced incumbents on or around March 3rd. Since the FDR presidency,
inaugurations have taken place on January 20th. Not only did both of these sources fail to
account for this overlap, but the overlap between the death or resignation of presidents
was also ill accounted for. The majority of these inconsistencies amounted to 1-6 orders
being credited to the wrong president. However, in the instance of President Cleveland’s
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Table 2 Justices Presidents in the Roosevelt Regime Faced
President

Justice

Appointed

Regime
Match?

President

Justice

Appointed

Regime
Match?

Franklin
Roosevelt

Charles Evans
Hughes

Hoover

No

Lyndon B.
Johnson

Earl Warren

Eisenhower

Yes

Harlan Fiske Stone

Coolidge

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Truman

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Kennedy

Yes

Kennedy

Yes

Willis Van
Devanter
James Clark
McReynolds
Louis Dembitz
Brandeis

Taft

No

Wilson

No

Wilson

No

George Sutherland

Harding

No

Pierce Butler

Harding

No

Owen Josephus
Roberts
Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo
Hugo Lafayette
Black
Stanley Forman
Reed

Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond
White
Arthur Joseph
Goldberg

Hoover

No

Hoover

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Abe Fortas

Johnson

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Thurgood
Marshall

Johnson

Yes

Felix Frankfurter

Roosevelt

Yes

Earl Warren

Eisenhower

No

William Orville
Douglas

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

Yes

Frank Murphy

Roosevelt

Yes

Roosevelt

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Roosevelt

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Potter Stewart

Eisenhower

No

Truman

Yes

Byron Raymond
White

Kennedy

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Abe Fortas

Johnson

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Johnson

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

Yes

Felix Frankfurter

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

Yes

William Orville
Douglas

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

Yes

Nixon

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

James Francis
Byrnes
Robert Houghwout
Jackson
Wiley Blount
Rutledge
Harry S.
Truman

Hugo Lafayette
Black
William Orville
Douglas
Tom Campbell
Clark
John Marshall
Harlan
William J.
Brennan Jr.

Harlan Fiske Stone
Fred Moore
Vinson
Owen Josephus
Roberts
Hugo Lafayette
Black
Stanley Forman
Reed

Frank Murphy
Robert Houghwout
Jackson
Wiley Blount
Rutledge
Harold Hitz Burton
Tom Campbell
Clark

Richard
M. Nixon

Warren Earl
Burger
Hugo Lafayette
Black
William Orville
Douglas
John Marshall
Harlan
William J.
Brennan Jr.

Gerald R.
Ford

Thurgood
Marshall
Harry A.
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell
Jr.
William H.
Rehnquist
Warren Earl
Burger
William Orville
Douglas
William J.
Brennan Jr.

Roosevelt

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Truman

Yes

Potter Stewart

Eisenhower

Yes

Yes

Byron Raymond
White

Kennedy

Yes

Truman

32
President

Justice

Appointed

Regime
Match?

President

Justice

Appointed

Regime
Match?

Harry S.
Truman

Sherman Minton

Truman

Yes

Gerald R.
Ford

Thurgood
Marshall

Johnson

Yes

Dwight D.
Eisenhower

Fred Moore
Vinson

Truman

Yes

Nixon

No

Earl Warren

Eisenhower

Yes

Nixon

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Ford

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Nixon

No

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Harold Hitz Burton

Truman

Yes

Kennedy

Yes

Tom Campbell
Clark

Truman

Yes

Johnson

Yes

Sherman Minton

Truman

Yes

Nixon

No

Eisenhower

Yes

Nixon

No

Eisenhower

Yes

Nixon

No

Eisenhower

Yes

Ford

Yes

Potter Stewart

Eisenhower

Yes

Nixon

No

Earl Warren

Eisenhower

Yes

Regan

Yes

Hugo Lafayette
Black

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

No

Felix Frankfurter

Roosevelt

Yes

Eisenhower

No

Kennedy

No

Johnson

No

Nixon

No

Nixon

No

Ford

No

Regan

Yes

Hugo Lafayette
Black
Stanley Forman
Reed
Felix Frankfurter
William Orville
Douglas
Robert Houghwout
Jackson

John Marshall
Harlan
William J. Brennan
Jr.
Charles Evans
Whittaker

John F.
Kennedy

William Orville
Douglas
Tom Campbell
Clark
John Marshall
Harlan
William J. Brennan
Jr.
Charles Evans
Whittaker
Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond
White
Arthur Joseph
Goldberg

James
Carter

Harry A.
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell
Jr.
William H.
Rehnquist
John Paul
Stevens
Warren Earl
Burger
William J.
Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond
White
Thurgood
Marshall
Harry A.
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell
Jr.
William H.
Rehnquist
John Paul
Stevens

Ronald
Reagan

Warren Earl
Burger
William H.
Rehnquist
William J.
Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond
White
Thurgood
Marshall
Harry A.
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell
Jr.
John Paul
Stevens
Sandra Day
O'Connor

Roosevelt

Yes

Truman

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Eisenhower

Yes

Kennedy

Yes

Antonin Scalia

Regan

Yes

Kennedy

Yes

Anthony M.
Kennedy

Regan

Yes
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second term, Vital Statistics credited him with twelve orders that were issued by
Presidents Harrison and McKinley.
Because of this inaccuracy, I deferred to the sources listed in Vital Statistics on
the Presidency. These sources included: List and Index of Presidential Executive Orders,
Unnumbered Series, 1789-1941 and Presidential Executive Orders, 1862-1935 by
Clifford Lord30. After further investigation, I determined there was not a reliable source
available to me that accurately represented the data I needed for this project.
This original dataset was a substantial undertaking, as four sources were used to
gather the data. I began by cross-referencing the dates recorded by Lord for
unnumbered31 and numbered executive orders with the inauguration dates documented by
the Library of Congress32. I was able to use these sources to provide the most accurate
count of executive orders issued per president per year for all presidents before Franklin
Roosevelt. This data was then combined with the data provided by the Federal Register to
create the original dataset found here that displays the average number of executive
orders issued per president per year33.
While this dataset is not without flaws and may benefit from further refinement, it
is the most accurate and exhaustive list of executive orders issued per president per year
available for use in this project. With this new dataset, I was able to examine
Skowronek’s theories and the frequency of executive order issuance and contestation in
30

See Historical Records Surveys.
It is important to note here that we do not have complete records of all unnumbered executive
orders. While Lord provides for the most accurate account of unnumbered executive orders,
since they were not required to be officially recorded until 1933, I cannot guarantee I accounted
for all unnumbered executive orders ever issued.
32
See Drexler, Ken.
33
This dataset can be found in the Appendix, Table A.1.
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the Supreme Court more closely and accurately. While this data collection was worth the
results and is a contribution to the study of executive orders in and of itself, collecting
this data was not the original object of this project.
Executive Orders in the Supreme Court (Data)
The full scope of an examination of the results from my data collection outlined
above proved to be too considerable of an undertaking for this thesis34. In order to narrow
the extent of executive orders I examined, I decided to evaluate Skowronek’s theory in
terms of executive orders challenged in the Supreme Court. While the previous dataset
provided for all executive orders, this dataset35 would aim to examine EOs at the center
of debates over presidential authority and constitutionality. My first dataset accounts for
all executive orders, including ceremonial and administrative orders that have no
significant impact on policy.
Erica Newland undertook a study similar to the one I wished to complete for a
note in Yale Law Journal. However, her data was not readily available. She also
examined variables36 I did not, so another dataset had to be created. I followed the
methodology Newland recorded in her note and modified it to fit the needs of my study.
Following Newland’s model, I conducted two searches within Westlaw Edge to isolate
the initial corpus of cases. The first search was conducted within Westlaw Edge’s “Key
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While I encourage future researchers to accomplish such an examination, this would require
immense data collection across a multitude of variables not accounted for here.
35
This dataset can be found in the Appendix, Table A.2.
36
Newland considered executive orders, presidential proclamations, and presidential memoranda
as executive orders. She also examined cases in the D.C. Circuit Court in addition to the
Supreme Court.
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Number search”37 where I searched: adv: (“Executive order!”) within all key numbers.
Case information relating to all cases with headnotes that handle executive orders was
exported into Excel for further refinement. Exporting the results and filtering them for
decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court returned fifty-five results. For the second
search I used Westlaw Edge’s advanced search function. Here, I searched Westlaw’s case
synopses by using the SY() field. I used the query adv: SY(“Executive order!”) and again
filtered for decisions made by the Supreme Court. This search yielded forty-four
additional cases to review, only one of which had been identified in the Key Number
search. Newland conducts a third search designed to ensure no Supreme Court decisions
that featured substantive discussion of executive orders were left out. Using the advanced
search function of Westlaw Edge again, I used the following search query: adv:
LE(ATLEAST5 (“Executive order!)) %HE (“Executive order!”) %SE(“Executive
order!). This ensures that every case that references the term executive order at least five
times was accounted for. This search yielded twenty-four additional results, only one of
which had been identified in a previous search. However, upon examination of each of
these cases, I determined none of them were relevant38 to my research.
These searches identified ninety-nine cases with potential for being included in
the dataset. From here I investigated each case to (1) identify which cases genuinely dealt
with executive orders and had relevance to my research (2) identify which president
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A Key Number search identifies headnotes created by Westlaw that include all search terms.
Headnotes aim to capture the specific aspects of law brought about in each case; they are useful
to identify when cases arise that pertain to executive orders.
38
Cases were determined to be irrelevant if they referenced local-level, state-level, or agencylevel executive orders, if they amended previous cases, or if EOs were simply cited rather than
challenged in the case. In Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, the court even went as far as to
express “it is not necessary here to consider the validity or effect of the executive order.” This
case was not included in my final dataset.
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wrote the executive order being contested39 and (3) determine if the case favored or
opposed the presidents use of executive orders. Instances when the same executive order
was placed on trial multiple times were counted as separate instances as they were
separate examinations of presidential power. After inspection of each case, sixty were
determined to be relevant to this project.
There are many Supreme Court cases that deal with presidential overreach and
congressional delegation of authority to the president. This mechanism is part of the
checks and balances principle which is foundational to our governmental system. Both
datasets developed here are original and further political scholarship on executive orders.

Results

The main goal of this project was to create datasets and analyze the descriptive
statistics resulting in light of Skowronek’s theories. Figure 3 shows Figure 1 colorcoded40 to represent Skowronek’s distinct categories. The x-axis displays each president
in chronological order while the y-axis shows the average number of executive orders
each president issued per year. While this graph is a great display of issuance over time, it
also illustrates where each presidential category falls. On its face, this particular graph
does not tell us much more about executive order issuance than Figure 1. This graph
displays the influence secular time has on executive order issuance, as it shows an influx
39

It was important to determine which president issued the EO in question rather than basing my
timeline on when arguments and the decision took place. There were multiple instances where
the challenge to the EO came years after the issuing president had stepped down.
40
Green represents reconstructionists, yellow depicts articulators, red portrays disjunctive
presidents, and purple symbolizes preemptive presidents.
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of orders issued between the Roosevelt presidencies, the negligible amount of orders
issued at America’s beginning, and a more regular use of EOs post WWII, but we fail to
see any specific Skowronek typology stick out above the rest.

Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
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An element worth noticing is that the period of time that experienced the highest
frequencies of executive order issuance began with an articulator and ended with a
reconstructionist. Reconstructionists are generally the ones who start presidential trends
for a regime, so this finding seems counterintuitive to Skowronek’s theory of the
presidency. However, FDR is an outlier when it comes to executive orders due to the
extenuating circumstances surrounding the Great Depression and World War II and his
longevity in office.
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Figures 4-11 show Figure 3 on a closer scale. Figure 3 is perfect for showing EO
distribution over time, but in order to accurately evaluate Skowronek’s theory in more
depth, a closer analysis is necessary.
Because it is evident that EO issuance has been influenced by secular time, this
project was continued by examining the past forty-five presidents in three equal sections.
Each graph shows a group of fifteen presidencies. The main goal behind this separation
was to be able to examine the first 15 years of the presidency as their relevance is
diminished in Figure 3 when compared to the Roosevelt presidencies. Figure 4
contributes the most added information out of Figures 4-6, but together all of these
graphs fail to show a significant relationship between executive order issuance and
Skowronek typologies. Upon this primary examination, it appears Skowronek’s theory
does not account for fluctuations in executive order issuance.
To continue the investigation into if Skowronek’s theories could account for
executive orders, Figure 3 was once again divided into different sections. This time, each
regime as described by Skowronek was examined, rather than making the graphs a
function of secular time or clusters of presidencies. Figures 7-11 each illustrate a partisan
regime as described by Stephen Skowronek. These were created to discern any trends of
presidential categories within the presidential eras Skowronek characterizes.
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Figure 10
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This comparison of Figures 7-11 determines if Skowronek’s theory correlates to
fluctuations in EO issuance. If Skowronek’s theory can be applied to executive order
issuance, it should be observed that a specific type of president consistently issues more
executive orders than the other presidential categories. As displayed, three out of four
complete regimes show disjunctive presidents issuing more executive orders on average
than their reconstructive and articulative counterparts. More so, disjunctive presidents
usually issue the most executive orders compared to all presidents within each
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Skowronek regime. The only regime in which disjunctive presidents do not issue the
most executive orders is during Skowronek’s Franklin Roosevelt Leadership era.
However, because FDR is the reconstructionist in this era, and is the only presidential
type that issues more orders than the disjunctive president in this era (Jimmy Carter), and
because FDR is the outlier when it comes to executive order issuance, this could be due
to the exceptional circumstances of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency and less of a
failure of Skowronek’s theory to apply to executive order issuance. In this same channel
of observations, it is worth noticing that all reconstructionists issued the fewest executive
orders (other than FDR). This points to the plethora of resources available to them
outside of executive orders.
It is also worth noting the change in EO issuance between presidents Lincoln and
Hoover. A major shift in EO issuance as a function of secular time took place in this era,
as Theodore Roosevelt regulated the use of executive orders and modified not only the
face of his regime, but the face of the presidency. This helps point to the main takeaway
from this investigation, which is that executive order issuance is a function of both
secular time and political time. While we find disjunctive presidents usually issue more
orders than the other types outlined by Skowronek, we do not learn anything about the
presidents that don’t fit into these categories and their executive order issuance. While we
can conclude disjunctive presidents usually issue more and reconstructionists generally
issue less executive orders than any other presidential type, this does not tell us much
about presidents uncategorized by Skowronek and how they fit into the fluctuation of EO
issuance over time. This conclusion only accounts for 6 of the presidents so far.
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However, we do learn that the political arrangements that create a disjunctive executive
environment are also conducive to an increase in executive order issuance.
Another problem with this conclusion is that it proves that disjunctive presidents
are likely to issue more orders than other Skowronek typologies, as a function of
Skowronek's regime eras. The patterns we identify in Figures 7-11 apply only to
Skowronek’s timeline. Although a thorough quantitative analysis has not been conducted
here, a display of Skowronek’s characterization of presidents accounting for variations in
EO issuance is shown. While it is evident secular time affects EO issuance, categorizing
the presidency as Skowronek does also offers new information about frequency of
executive orders.
Supreme Court
Figures 12-14 illustrate presidential relationships with the Supreme Court with
respect to executive orders over time. Since so few orders are contested in the Court by
any specific president, it is unnecessary to divide up the graphs to get a better view of
each regime or era of the presidency as done in the previous section. Figure 12 highlights
the total number of executive orders each president had contested in the Court. Figure 13
shows the number of executive orders the Supreme Court opposed in some way. Whether
this was Court acknowledgment of an executive order being an overreach of presidential
power, a statement suggesting the order be reconsidered and modified, or outright
rejection of a president’s authority to issue an executive order, these cases mark the
extent of judicial authority over executive orders. Figure 14 illustrates the number of
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Figure 12
Total Cases Contesting Executive Orders in Supreme Court per Presidency
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Figure 13
Total Cases Ruled in Opposition of Executive Order per Presidency
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Figure 14
Total Cases Ruled in Favor of Executive Order per Presidency
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executive orders the Supreme Court ruled to be constitutional. As demonstrated, the
majority of executive orders contested in the Supreme Court are ruled constitutional and
upheld through the Court’s authority.
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The same color-coding scheme was applied to Figures 12-14 to illustrate
Skowronek’s categories. As one can see, there are no clear patterns revealed, which
indicates that while Skowronek’s theory may contribute to our understanding of
executive order issuance, it does not explain variations within EO contestation in the
Supreme Court. It is worth noting that not many of these orders have been struck down
by the court and most have survived argument.
Table 3 Correlation Between Skowronek and the Supreme Court
Skowronek
Contestation
Category
1
0
2
0
3
0
1
0
4
0
2
1
3
1
1
1
4
0
2
1
4
3
3
1
1
12
2
1
4
1
3
3
1
2
4
1
Correlation Coefficient:
-0.247646503

Table 3 was used to see if a correlation existed between the Skowronek types and
contestation in the Supreme Court. Each presidential category was assigned a number
(one for reconstruction, two for articulation, three for disjunction and four for
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preemption) in the first column, and the number of orders contested in the Supreme Court
for each president is listed in the second column. The coefficient calculated (-0.2476)
shows the lack of correlation between Skowronek’s presidential categories and
contestation in the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

The Politics Presidents Make has been criticized by many for being too simplistic.
Skowronek’s theory can apply to the presidency on a macrolevel, but it has yet to be
determined if this political timeline can be observed on a microlevel as well. Many
criticize his theory for failing to account for the details that surround a president’s
decision-making environment (Hoekstra 1999; Milkis 1995; Silbey 1994). This
investigation set out to evaluate if Skowronek’s theory could apply to the presidency on a
microlevel.
Although feeble results were presented in relation to the Supreme Court analysis,
this research still contributes to our knowledge about executive orders. EO issuance and
contestation in the Supreme Court represent occasions when presidents take control of
their own narrative and make policy change by themselves. Examining legal challenges
to executive orders has given insight to Skowronek’s theory and supports the claims of
his critics that his theory is inapplicable to an examination of the presidency on a
microlevel. While perhaps this topic is too small for Skowronek to account for, here lies
an investigation into what influences the number of executive orders challenged in the
Court, and a determination of what does not account for these fluctuations.
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The way in which Skowronek divides administrations may not explain why we
see an influx in challenges to executive orders during specific presidencies, but it still
contributes to our understanding of the presidency in a considerable way. It is possible
this relationship is due to mechanisms in the court rather than the presidency, which is
why Skowronek’s theory does not apply perfectly. This relationship may result from the
Court’s inability to assess the constitutionality of an executive order without a case being
brought before them, or the Court’s hesitancy to answer questions beyond the scope of
the case on trial.
There are other factors that affect the frequency of executive orders that are not
found within Skowronek’s characterization of presidents. It is evident that secular timing
does have an effect on the issuance of executive orders, however, this does not account
for all EO averages, as the relationship is not exponential nor stable. Skowronek’s
categories do provide some insight into the fluctuations of EO issuance within his regime
types. The findings support my theory that disjunctive presidents issue the most executive
orders while reconstructionists issue the least (except in the case of FDR). While
Skowronek’s theory does not provide a way to predict how many EOs a president will
issue in comparison to other presidents, these findings show presidents who are affiliated
with a failing regime are forced to use executive orders, and presidents who are opposed
to a failed regime have other tools available to them and are likely to opt against issuing
executive orders.
There is no debate that Stephen Skowronek’s political timeline theory is
revolutionary in the scholarship surrounding the American presidency. Skowronek has
provided a new way to view the presidency and a path to further compare and contrast
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this eminent position. Skowronek explains situational variables that determine how a
president will administrate. The question this research attempted to answer was if
Skowronek’s theory could identify the political arrangements or situational variables that
result in a change in the frequency of executive orders and contestation in the Supreme
Court. While this research produced insights into aggregate patterns of unilateral activity,
these studies are limited in that they do not consider the unknowable cases of when
presidents opt not to take unilateral action. Only executive orders are examined here, and
only those contested in the Supreme Court.
With the limited resources available at the start of this project, the fact that two
original datasets were created add to the significance of this research. While the analysis
of challenges to executive orders in the Supreme court in accordance with Skowronek’s
theory proved moot, the data collected and now available to other researchers is
invaluable and a considerable contribution to scholarship on the presidency.
There are many possibilities for continuation of this research. Because two
datasets were created within this project, potential use of this data is boundless. Perhaps
the analysis on executive order issuance could be performed on executive orders that deal
with policy only, removing ceremonial and administrative EOs from the picture. In
addition to this, an examination of orders dealing with foreign versus domestic policy
could be conducted to see if Skowronek’s categories can account for a specific kind of
order better than it does for all orders.
On top of extending this research to include presidential proclamations,
memoranda, and signing statements, this research could be continued by examining the
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executive order issuance in light of changing congressional conditions. Perhaps
examining if there is a particular type of president that issue more orders when Congress
is out of session or examining the relationship between executive order issuance and
congressional partisanship. Because it is evident secular timing does have an effect on
executive order issuance, further research into why so many EOs were issued during the
early 1900s and why we have seen a decline since may prove fruitful.
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Table A.1 Executive Order Issuance
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Table A.2 Supreme Court Contestations
Number

Title

Filed Date

Favor

1

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S.

2

Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co.

3

Andrus v. Utah

5/19/1980

1

Franklin Roosevelt
Truman / Franklin
Roosevelt
Franklin Roosevelt

4

Arizona v. California

Arthur

Boumediene V Bush

3/27/2006
6/12/2008

1

5

0

Bush

6

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown

4/18/1979

1

Lyndon Johnson

7

Clark v. U.S.

10/1/1880

1

Lincoln

8

Cole v. Young

6/11/1956

0

Eisenhower

9

2/17/1947

1

Grant

1

Reagan

11

Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. U.S.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico

4/25/1989

1

Cleveland (1887)

12

Dames & Moore v. Regan

7/2/1981

1

Carter

13

Department of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean

1/21/2015

1

Obama

14

Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink

1/22/1973

1

Eisenhower

15

Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sutherland

1/17/1927

1

Wilson

16

Halbert v. U.S.

6/1/1931

1

Taft

17

Hampton v. Wong

6/1/1976

1

Eisenhower

18

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.

6/25/2007

0

George W. Bush

19

Hilton v. Sullivan

6/25/2007

1

Coolidge

20

Hirabayashi v. U.S.

6/21/1943

1

Franklin Roosevelt

21

Idaho v. U.S.

6/18/2001

1

Grant

22

Johnson v. Drew

5/31/1898

0

Hayes

23

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath

Truman

Korematsu v. U.S.

4/30/1951
12/18/1944

1

24

0

Franklin Roosevelt

25

Loving v. U.S.

6/3/1996

1

Reagan

26

Lyon v. Singer

6/5/1950

1

Franklin Roosevelt

27

Mattz v. Arnett

6/11/1973

1

Pierce

28

1/25/1982

1

Cleveland (1887)

30

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of
the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

31

Morton v. Mancari

32

34

Ng Fung Ho v. White
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat. Association of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin
Orvis v. Brownell

35

Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co. v. U.S.

36

10

29

5/27/1935
5/24/1954

7/2/1985

1

1

3/24/1999

0

Carter
Taylor

6/17/1974

1

Eisenhower

5/29/1922

1

Wilson

1

Nixon

3/16/1953

1

Franklin Roosevelt

2/28/1927
1/7/1935

0

Harding

Panama Refining Co. v Ryan

1

Franklin Roosevelt

37

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice

6/21/1989

0

Kennedy

38

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

6/21/1993

1

George Bush

39

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

6/29/2020

0

Obama

33

4/21/2009

0

President

6/25/1974
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Title

Filed Date

Favor41

President

40

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S.

5/11/1942

1

Hayes / Arthur

41

Starr v. Long Jim

2/24/1913

1

Cleveland (1886)

42

State of Arizona v. State of California

Grant

Texas v U.S.

3/9/1964
3/31/1998

1

43

1

Obama

44

Trump v. Hawaii

6/26/2018

1

Trump

45

6/26/2017

1

Trump

1

Teddy Roosevelt

47

Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project
U. S. Civil Service Commission v. National Association
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO
U. S. v. Alaska

6/23/1975

0

Harding (1922)

48

U.S. v. Alaska

6/19/1997

1

Harding (1923)

49

U.S. v. Allied Oil Corp.

4/9/1951

1

Truman

50

U.S. v. Bergh

11/19/1956

1

Franklin Roosevelt

51

U.S. v. Chemical Foundation

10/11/1926

1

Polk

52

U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co.

2/23/1915

1

Wilson

53

U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co.

4/30/1951

0

Franklin Roosevelt

54

U.S. v. Sperry Corp.

Carter

U.S. v United Mine Workers

11/28/1989
3/6/1947

1

55

1

Truman

56

U.S. v. Wittek

6/13/1949

1

Franklin Roosevelt

57

Udall v. Tallman

3/1/1965

1

Hoover

58

White v. Berry

5/31/1898

0

Cleveland

59

Yasui v. U.S.

6/21/1943

1

Franklin Roosevelt

60

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

6/2/1952

0

Truman

46

6/25/1973

A ‘zero’ in this column represents cases where the court opposed the executive order. A ‘one’
indicates cases where the court ruled in favor of keeping the executive order.
41

